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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In a real-time system, several tasks with specific deadlines can co-execute on a hardware platform. Each task has some characteristics and generates infinite jobs in a very
predictable manner. For example in a sporadic task system, different jobs are generated in a periodic manner and they have upper bounds upon their worst-case execution
requirement and associated deadlines. In implicit-deadline sporadic tasks system, the
deadline of jobs are equal to the time interval between to consecutive jobs of the task.
These tasks should be scheduled such that the timing requirements of all tasks are satisfied. Scheduling implicit-deadline sporadic task systems using static and dynamic priority
scheduling is well-understood for the traditional (non-competitive) setting. In this thesis,
we consider scheduling implicit-deadline sporadic task systems upon a preemptive single
processor platform in the presence of competition using the earliest-deadline-first (EDF)
and the rate-monotonic (RM) scheduling algorithms. In the competitive setting, a value
parameter is associated with each task that represents how much value is obtained by
successful execution of all jobs of that task. Under the assumption that the processor
cannot feasibly satisfy the temporal requirements of all the tasks, we are interested in
selecting a subset of these tasks so that the resulting subset is feasible and the sum of
the values of selected tasks is maximized.
For EDF scheduling, this problem is equivalent to the well known 0-1 knapsack problem in which the items’ weights are utilizations of the tasks and the items’ values are the
values of the tasks. There are pseudo-polynomial time and also fully polynomial-time
approximation scheme (FPTAS) algorithms that can solve this problem [31]. In the case
of RM setting, the aforementioned 0-1 knapsack algorithms are not immediately applicable. We use the utilization-based feasibility test which is a sufficient condition and,
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we propose a pseudo-polynomial algorithm which optimally solves the problem. We also
propose an approximation algorithm for the RM setting.
Using these algorithms to solve the problems are useful when we assume that the true
characteristics of each task are known. This assumption is not valid in competitive environments such as cloud computing systems or shared real-time networks in which several
agents are competing for processor time upon a shared computational resource. The
agents may lie about their true task requirements and their value in order to maximize
their own obtained benefits from execution.
We consider the scheduling of sporadic tasks in a competitive environment in which
each task is owned by a separate agent. Each agent knows the characteristics of her own
task and reports a utilization and a value to the processor owner. Since each agent is
self-interested, she may report a utilization and value different from the true ones if she
knows that by doing this, her task will be selected to run on the processor. By considering
these self-interested agents, the problem is moved from the area of algorithm design to
that of mechanism design [21].
Mechanism design is the art of designing rules in a competitive environment to achieve
specific properties such as truthfulness and efficiency. The truthfulness property ensures
that the agents will always tell the truth and the efficiency property will provide a
maximized system-wide objective. Nisan and Ronen [27] were the first to consider the
use of mechanism design in computational settings. In recent years, mechanism design
has found many important applications in computer science such as network routing,
load balancing, auctioning and internet advertisements. Mechanism design has had a
spectacular commercial success. For example, Google and Yahoo! employ mechanism
design for internet advertisement auctions and their revenues from these auctions in 2005
were over $6 billion and $2.6 billion respectively [13].
Given the significant impact of mechanism design in a large spectrum of computer
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science domains, it behooves us to understand the effects of competition on the design of
real-time open environments in which several independently-developed real-time applications may share the same computational platform. Furthermore, future real-time and
cyber-physical systems are likely to be open [1]. A lack of understanding of the effects
of competition on the temporal correctness of open systems will ultimately lead to an
inefficient allocation of resources.
Unfortunately, as we will see in the related work section, there is only one paper
that addresses real-time scheduling under competition. Furthermore, this prior paper
focuses on online scheduling of aperiodic jobs and not traditional hard-real-time recurring
tasks. As an initial starting point for our exploration of competitive real-time systems,
we consider the simple environment of implicit-deadline sporadic tasks to be scheduled
based on the EDF and RM algorithms. A mechanism will take the task characteristics
from each agent and decide which agents obtain the processor. The mechanism also
determines the amount that should be paid by the agents who obtained the processor.
We are interested in designing mechanisms that give incentives to the agents to report the
true characteristics of their tasks and thus, guarantee an efficient processor allocation.

1.1

Related Work

Sporadic real-time task scheduling upon a uniprocessor in non-competitive settings
has been studied extensively [20, 24]. For implicit-deadline sporadic tasks systems,
Lehoczky et al. [19] presented an exact feasibility test for static-priority scheduling algorithms. Liu and Layland [20] presented a sufficient schedubility test for implicit-deadline
sporadic task systems based on rate-monotonic scheduling algorithm.
In a hard real-time system, only tasks that meet their deadlines are considered to be
successful. If it is not possible to guarantee the successful completion of all the tasks,
the goal is typically to optimize a performance metric. A common metric is to associate
a value with each task and quantify the “goodness” of an algorithm by the accumulated
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values of successful tasks [7, 6, 10]. Aydin et al. [5] studied reward-based scheduling for
periodic tasks in which there is a reward associated with each task’s execution. Each task
is composed of a mandatory and an optional part. The mandatory part must meet the
task’s deadline, while a non-decreasing reward function is associated with the execution
of the optional part. The goal is to find a schedule that maximizes the weighted average
reward. All of these prior works assume that the task characteristics are publicly known,
and none of them considers a competitive setting, in which the task’s characteristics are
private to the agents and the agents compete for resources.
Nisan and Ronen [27] introduced the technique of algorithmic mechanism design for
computational problems in a competitive setting. They addressed the problem of minimization of the make-span of tasks on parallel machines by designing a truthful approximation mechanism for the problem. The field of mechanism design has been applied to
several computer science problems such as routing [14] and multicast transmission [15].
Aggarwal et al. [3] studied knapsack auctions for selling advertisements on Internet search
engines in which the size of objects are publicly known. Their work is related to our study,
in both cases the underlying optimization problem is the knapsack problem.
There are only a few works we are aware of that apply the field of game theory and
mechanism design to real-time systems. Sheikh et al. [29] used a game-theoretic computational technique to solve the problem of scheduling strictly periodic tasks in a noncompetitive environment. Porter [28] studied the problem of online real-time scheduling
of jobs on a single processor in a competitive environment. In this work, the private type
of the agents consists of release time, job length, deadline, and value. However, none
of these prior works on scheduling considers traditional recurring tasks (e.g., sporadic
or periodic tasks) which are commonly found in real-time applications. The goal of our
thesis is to investigate competitive scheduling for recurring tasks by introducing, developing, and analyzing techniques of mechanism design for scheduling sporadic tasks on a
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shared single processor platform.

1.2

Our Contributions

In this thesis, we employ the field of mechanism design for assigning a single processor
to real-time sporadic tasks. These are our contributions in this work:
• We employ the field of mechanism design for scheduling implicit-deadline sporadic
task systems upon a single processor in a competitive setting. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work that considers scheduling recurring tasks in a
competitive environment.
• We design truthful exact mechanisms based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
mechanism [32, 11, 16] that allocates the single processor to a subset of participating agents based on EDF and RM scheduling algorithms. These mechanisms use
dynamic programming algorithms to optimally select the agents who obtain the
processor.
• We evaluate multiple definitions of frugality and determine the most suitable definition for real-time scheduling of sporadic tasks. The frugality ratio of a mechanism
measures the amount of payment made by the agents compared to the agent’s
values.
• Since the allocation algorithms for the truthful exact mechanisms are computationally intractable, we provide truthful approximation mechanisms which use fully
polynomial-time approximation scheme algorithms to find a near-optimal allocation
and derive their frugality ratios.
• The total payments by the agents can be less than the cost of operating the system;
therefore, we design truthful mechanisms with reserve prices which guarantee a
minimum profit for the processor owner.
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• We perform simulations to investigate the effects of non-truthful behavior of agents,
comparing payments to the reported values, determining the frugality ratios of the
mechanisms, and comparing the execution times of the mechanisms.
The results presented in this thesis were published in Proceedings of the 24th Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS12) [22]. An extended version of this
paper is under review for IEEE Transactions on Computers [23].

1.3

Organization

The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss the problem of implicitdeadline sporadic task scheduling in both non-competitive and competitive environments
and using dynamic and static-priority task scheduling algorithms. In Chapter 3, we
review the basic concepts of mechanism design and introduce truthful exact mechanisms
to solve the problems in competitive environments. We also discuss the frugality of the
mechanisms. In Chapter 4, we present truthful approximation mechanisms and derive
bounds on their frugality. In Chapter 5, we present and discuss experimental results.
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CHAPTER 2
MODEL
In this chapter, we discuss the original problem of scheduling implicit-deadline sporadic task systems on a single processor and present previous results. We also define the
competitive version of the problem, where there is a value associated with each task. We
give examples that illustrate the need for mechanism design in competitive settings.

2.1

Implicit Deadline Sporadic Task Model

In a sporadic task system S = {Ti |i = 1, . . . , n}, each task Ti = (ei , di , pi ) is characterized by three parameters: (i) the worst-case execution time of each job, ei ; (ii) the
relative deadline, di ; and (iii) the minimum separation between successive job releases of
the task, pi . The utilization ui of task Ti , is defined as the ratio of the execution time of
the task to its period, ui = ei /pi . A sporadic task system is a finite collection of sporadic
P
tasks. The utilization of a sporadic task system S is defined as U(S) = Ti ∈S ui .
We consider the case of implicit-deadline sporadic task systems in which the relative
deadline of each job is equal to the minimum separation between successive jobs of the
task, (di = pi ) for all tasks. We consider both dynamic-priority and static-priority task
scheduling. In the dynamic-priority scheduling of sporadic tasks, all the jobs generated
by a task may have different priorities, but in static priority-scheduling they the same
priority.
For the dynamic-priority scheduling, it has been shown that the earliest deadline first
scheduling algorithm (EDF) is an optimal algorithm for scheduling sporadic tasks in a
preemptive environment [20, 24]. In other words, if it is possible to preemptively schedule
a task system such that all the jobs meet their deadlines, then the EDF algorithm for
this task system will meet all deadlines as well. A necessary and sufficient condition [24]
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for any implicit-deadline system S to be feasible upon a uniprocessor is U(S) ≤ 1.
For implicit-deadline sporadic task systems, the rate-monotonic (RM) algorithm, is
an optimal priority assignment in the static-priority scheduling. The RM algorithm
assigns priorities to the tasks in inverse proportion to their period parameters, i.e., task
Ti has higher priority than Tj ’s priority if pi < pj . It has been shown that ([20]), an
implicit-deadline sporadic task system S is static-priority feasible if
1

U(S) ≤ n(2 n − 1),

(2.1)

where U(S) is its total utilization (the sum of utilizations of all tasks) and n is the
number of tasks (i.e., n = |S|). This is a sufficient condition but not necessary condition
for feasibility. In this thesis, we use this test to check the feasibility of a sporadic task
system.

2.2

Competitive Allocations

Consider an environment where each task Ti is owned by Agent i and each agent
competes for allocation of the processor to her task. Each agent declares a value she
wishes to pay if her task is selected to run on the processor. Each Agent i is characterized
by a type θi = (ui , vi ), where ui is the utilization required to execute the task and vi is
the value derived by the agent from executing the task. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set
of all agents. A set of agents is feasible if it is possible to schedule their tasks such that
they meet their deadlines, i.e., for dynamic-priority scheduling, the sum of utilizations
of selected agents should be less than or equal to 1 and for static-priority scheduling the
1

sum of utilizations of selected agents is at most k(2 k − 1), where k is the number of
selected agents. Our objective is to allocate the processor to a feasible subset O ⊆ N so
that the sum of the values of the agents in O is maximized. This is a common objective
in economics and is also referred to as social welfare. We formulate two problems of
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maximizing the social welfare, one for EDF and one for RM as follows.
EDF-MAXVAL Problem: Given agent types θi = (ui , vi ), i = 1, . . . , n
Maximize
subject to:

Pn

i=1

Pn

i=1

vi xi
(2.2)

ui xi ≤ 1

xi ∈ {0, 1}
RM-MAXVAL Problem: Given agent types θi = (ui , vi ), i = 1, . . . , n
Maximize
subject to:

Pn

i=1

vi xi

Pn

1/
i=1 ui xi ≤ (2

Pn

i=1

xi

− 1)

Pn

i=1

xi

(2.3)

xi ∈ {0, 1}
where xi = 1, when Agent i is selected, and xi = 0, otherwise. The constraints ensure
that the set of selected tasks is feasible. We consider that the values (vi , i = 1, .., n) are
integers. The EDF-MAXVAL and RM-MAXVAL are natural formulations of the problem
of determining how to allocate a shared processor and still guarantee that admitted
tasks can meet their deadlines. Please note that EDF-MAXVAL and RM-MAXVAL
use, in their formulation, only ui and vi for each task Ti . We may ignore, for now the
particular values of ei , pi , and di . For any agent that is selected, we may successfully
accommodate, via EDF or RM, any pi and ei such that ui = ei /pi (given the implicitdeadline assumption). In the following sections, we present two algorithms for solving
the EDF-MAXVAL and RM-MAXVAL problems.

2.2.1

Algorithm for Solving EDF-MAXVAL

The EDF-MAXVAL problem is the standard 0-1 knapsack problem and is NP-hard;
however, the problem does admit a pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm based on dynamic
programming [31]. We restate the dynamic programming approach in the following. Let
V be the maximum of the values of all tasks, i.e., V = maxni=1 vi . It is trivial that an
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Algorithm 1 EDF-MAXVAL-DP: Allocation Algorithm
1: input: u1 , . . . , un and v1 , . . . , vn .
2: V = maxi vi ;
3: for j = 1 to nV do
4:
if v1 = j then
5:
U(1, j) = u1
6:
else
7:
U(1, j) = ∞
8:
end if
9: end for
10: for i = 1 to n − 1 do
11:
for j = 1 to nV do
12:
if vi+1 ≤ j then
13:
U(i + 1, j) = min {U(i, j), ui+1 + U(i, j − vi+1 )}
14:
else
15:
U(i + 1, j) = U(i, j)
16:
end if
17:
end for
18: end for
19: opt = max {v|U(n, v) ≤ 1}
20: O = the set of selected agents by looking backward at U(i, j).
21: output (opt, O)
upper bound on the maximum value that can be achieved by any solution is nV . For
each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and v ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nV }, let Si,v denote a subset of tasks {1, 2, . . . , i}
whose total value is exactly v and whose total utilization is minimized. Let U(i, v) denote
the utilization of the set Si,v (it is ∞ if no such set exists). Clearly, U(1, v) is known for
every v ∈ {1, . . . , nV }. The following recurrence computes all values U(i, v) in O(n2 V )
time:


 min{U(i, v), ui+1 + U(i, v − vi+1 )} if vi+1 ≤ v,
U(i + 1, v) =

 U(i, v)
otherwise.

(2.4)

The maximum value achievable by a set of tasks with total utilization bounded by
1 is max {v|U(n, v) ≤ 1}. The dynamic programming algorithm EDF-MAXVAL-DP is

11
given in Algorithm 1. We are computing the optimum aggregate value in lines 2-19.
In Line 20, we obtain the selected tasks. We can do this by just looking backward at
U(i, j) matrix. Let opt = max {v|U(n, v) ≤ 1}. If U(n, opt) = U(n − 1, opt) then we
did not select the n-th item, so we just recursively work backwards from U(n − 1, opt).
Otherwise, we select that item, output the n-th task and recursively work backwards
from U(n − 1, opt − vn ). EDF-MAXVAL-DP determines the solution in O(n2 V ) time,
and thus, it is a pseudo-polynomial algorithm for EDF-MAXVAL.

2.3

Algorithm for Solving RM-MAXVAL

Now we propose a new dynamic programming algorithm for finding a feasible subset
which has the maximum total aggregate value for the RM settings. We use the utilization
bound feasibility test [20], i.e., a subset S ⊆ N is feasible if
U(S) ≤ |S|(21/|S| − 1)
The dynamic programming approach is as follow. Let V be the maximum of the
values of all tasks, i.e., V = maxni=1 vi . It is trivial that an upper bound on the maximum value that can be achieved by any solution is nV . For each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and
k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and v ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nV }, let Si,k,v denote a subset of tasks {1, 2, . . . , i}
whose total value is exactly v and contains exactly k tasks, and whose total utilization
is minimized. Let U(i, k, v) denote the utilization of the set Si,k,v (it is ∞ if no such set
exists). Clearly, U(1, k, v) is known for every k ∈ {0, . . . , n} and v ∈ {1, . . . , nV } and is



0 if k = 0,



U(1, k, v) =
u1 if v = v1 and k = 1,





∞ otherwise.

(2.5)
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The following recurrence computes all values U(i, k, v) in O(n3 V ) time:

U(i + 1, k, v) =



 min{U(i, k, v), ui+1 + U(i, k − 1, v − vi+1 )} if vi+1 ≤ v,

 U(i, k, v)

(2.6)

otherwise.

The maximum value achievable by a set of tasks is max{v|U(n, k, v) ≤ k(21/k −1), 1 ≤
k ≤ n}, where Sn,k,v is the task set associated with U(n, k, v). The dynamic programming
algorithm RM-MAXVAL-RMDP is given in Algorithm 2. We are computing the optimum
aggregate value in lines 2-24. In Line 25, we obtain the selected tasks. We can do this
by just looking backward at U(i, k, j) matrix as discussed in the previous section.
Now we prove that the algorithm is correct by using the following lemma:
Lemma 2.3.1 Let Ai be the set of agents {1, 2, ..., i}. U(i, k, v) is the minimum total
utilization that can be obtained by selecting exactly k agents in Ai with a total value equal
to v.
Proof The proof is by induction on i. It is easy to check that the statement is correct
for i = 1. For k = 0, U(1, k, v) = 0. If v = v1 , then U(1, 1, v) = u1 and U(1, k, v) = ∞,
for k > 1. If v 6= v1 , then U(1, k, v) = ∞, for every k > 0.
Now, assume that the statement holds for i, i.e., U(i, k, v) is the minimum total
utilization that can be obtained by a subset of k agents in Ai with total value equal
to v. We prove that the statement also holds for i + 1. In other words, we prove that
U(i + 1, k, v) is the minimum total utilization that can be obtained by a subset of k
agents in Ai+1 with total value equal to v. There are two possible cases: first, the set
with minimum utilization does not contain Agent i + 1, and, second it contains Agent
i + 1. In the first case, the minimum utilization is equal to U(i, k, v) and since this
is the minimum utilization (based on induction hypothesis), thus U(i + 1, k, v) is the
minimum utilization. In the second case, the minimum utilization is equal to the sum of
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Algorithm 2 RM-MAXVAL-DP: Allocation Algorithm
1: input: u1 , . . . , un and v1 , . . . , vn .
2: V = maxi vi ;
3: for i = 1 to n do
4:
for j = 1 to nV do
5:
U(i, 0, j) = 0
6:
end for
7: end for
8: for j = 1 to nV do
9:
for k = 1 to n do
10:
if v1 = j then
11:
U(1, k, j) = u1
12:
else
13:
U(1, k, j) = ∞
14:
end if
15:
end for
16: end for
17: for i = 1 to n − 1 do
18:
for k = 1 to n − 1 do
19:
for j = 1 to nV do
20:
if vi+1 ≤ j then
21:
U(i + 1, k, j) =
22:
min {U(i, k, j), ui+1 + U(i, k − 1, j − vi+1 )}
23:
else
24:
U(i + 1, k, j) = U(i, k, j)
25:
end if
26:
end for
27:
end for
28: end for
29: opt = max {v|U(n, k, v) ≤ k(21/k − 1), 1 ≤ k ≤ n}
30: O = the set of selected agents by looking backward at U(i, k, j).
31: output (opt, O)
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the utilization of agent i + 1 and the minimum utilization that can be obtained by using
k − 1 agents of Ai with total value equal to v − vi+1 . Since U(i, k − 1, v − vi+1 ) is the
minimum utilization of such subset (based on induction hypothesis), then U(i + 1, k, v)
is the minimum utilization and the proof is complete.
Theorem 2.3.2 Algorithm RM-MAXVAL-DP is correct.
Proof Suppose that the value obtained by the algorithm is v ∗ , corresponding to U(n, k ∗ , v ∗ ).
Thus, we have
v ∗ = max {v|U(n, k, v) ≤ k(21/k − 1), 1 ≤ k ≤ n}

(2.7)

i.e., for each v > v ∗ , we have U(n, k, v) > k(21/k − 1). By using Lemma 2.3.1, U(n, k, v)
is the minimum total utilization that can be obtained by selecting k agents with total
value v. Therefore, any subset with total value greater than v ∗ is infeasible, and v ∗ is the
maximum achievable value.
The time complexity of RM-MAXVAL-DP algorithm is O(n3 V ) which is pseudopolynomial time.

2.4

Motivating Examples

In order to compute the optimal solution for the EDF-MAXVAL and RM-MAXVAL
problems, we rely upon the agents to report their true types. However, we now give
examples to show how a lying agent can affect the outcome of the algorithms. We first
provide an example for EDF-MAXVAL.
EDF Motivating Example Consider a competitive environment with five agents. The
utilizations and values of the tasks owned by these agents are shown in Table 2.1. Since
all these tasks cannot be scheduled to execute on a single processor using the EDF
scheduling algorithm, we want to assign the processor to the agents such that we obtain
the maximum social welfare. If each agent is truthful, EDF-MAXVAL-DP assigns the
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Table 2.1: Agents’ types example
Agent 1
2
3
4
5
ui
0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.7
vi
2
7
8
9
11
processor to Agents 1, 2 and 5, which results in a welfare of 20. However, if Agent 4
lies and reports a valuation of 20 and everyone else report their true values, Agents 3
and 4 would be selected, giving a suboptimal social welfare of 17. Now, assume that all
agents report their true types except Agent 5 who lies about her required utilization and
declares 0.8 instead of her true utilization of 0.7. In this case, Agents 2 and 5 would be
selected, resulting in a suboptimal social welfare of 18, and Agent 1 would not be selected
anymore.

RM Motivating Example Consider the competitive environment with the same agents
shown in Table 2.1. Again all the tasks can not be scheduled on a single processor based
on the RM algorithm. According to the RM utilization feasibility test, a set of agents
is feasible, if the sum of utilizations of these tasks is at most URM (n) = n(21/n − 1),
where n is the number of tasks. The values of URM (n) for n = 1, ..., 5 are shown in
Table 2.2. If each agent is truthful, RM-MAXVAL-DP assigns the processor to Agents
1, 2 and 3, which results in a welfare of 17 and a total utilization of 0.7 which is less
than URM (3) = 0.780. As in the previous case, let assume that Agent 4 declares 20 as
her value instead of her true value. In this case, Agents 2 and 4 would be selected and
the suboptimal social welfare is 16. Now, assume that Agent 2 lies about her required
utilization and declares 0.3. In this case, Agents 2 and 3 would be selected, resulting in
a suboptimal social welfare of 16 and Agent 1 would not be selected anymore.
The allocations obtained above by non-truthful declarations, are inefficient and the
processor is not allocated to the agents that value the execution the most. We are
interested in ways to control the competition so that it is always in an agents’ interest to
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Table 2.2: Upper Bound on Total Utilization for RM Feasibility
n
1
2
3
4
5
URM (n) 1 0.828 0.780 0.757 0.743
declare their true types and achieve the optimal system welfare. In the following sections
we will design such mechanisms that give incentives to the agents to be truthful.
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CHAPTER 3
MECHANISM DESIGN
The field of mechanism design deals with algorithmic problems in a competitive environment. In this chapter, we present the basic concepts of mechanism design and
introduce VCG-based mechanisms for the EDF-MAXVAL and RM-MAXVAL problems.

3.1

Mechanism

Mechanism. A mechanism is composed of an allocation algorithm A and a payment
scheme π. The allocation algorithm determines which agents obtain the processor and
the payment scheme calculates the payment of each agent.
We consider the problem of allocating processor time to a set of n agents. Each
agent owns a sporadic task and declares a type which characterizes the utilization of her
task and the value derived from running the task on the processor. Since the agent may
strategically declare a different type from her true type, we denote Agent i’s declared
utilization and value by ûi and v̂i , respectively, and denote the true utilization and value
by ui and vi . We denote the declared type of Agent i by θ̂i and the true type by θi .
A mechanism takes, as input, all declared types from agents and computes an allocation. The mechanism gives incentives to the agents to reveal their true types by charging
them some payment. The allocation and payments depend on the agent declarations
θ̂ = (θ̂1 , . . . , θ̂n ).
The allocation algorithm is given as input the vector θ̂ of agents’ types, and outputs
a subset A(θ̂) ⊆ N of winning agents, where N is the set of participating agents. Thus,
Agent i wins if i ∈ A(θ̂). The social welfare obtained by the algorithm is given by
P
i∈A(θ̂) vi . The allocation algorithm attempts to maximize the social welfare.

18
The strategy of an agent is represented by her declared type and her goal is to
maximize her utility. We define Agent i’s utility as µi = vi − πi , where πi is the amount
Agent i is required to pay for having the task executed on the processor. If Agent i is not
selected to obtain the processor, then µi = 0. Agent i may strategically prefer to declare
a type different from her true type in order to increase her utility. We are interested in
a truthful mechanism where it is always in each agent’s best interest to declare her true
type.
Truthful Mechanism. A mechanism (A, π) is called truthful (or incentive compatible)
if for every declaration of the other agents θ̂ −i (i.e., θ̂ −i = (θ̂1 , . . . , θ̂i−1 , θ̂i+1 , . . . , θ̂n )),
and every declaration θ̂i′ of Agent i, we have: µi ≥ µ′i , where µi and µ′i are the utilities
obtained by Agent i when declaring θi and θ̂i′ , respectively. This means that truthful
revelation is a dominant strategy; that is, agents maximize their utilities by reporting
their true types.
In the rest of thesis, we assume that the agents always report a utilization equal to or
greater than the actual utilization required by their tasks (i.e., ûi ≥ ui , i = 1, . . . , n). The
reason is that if the agent reports a utilization less than the actual utilization of her task
and wins the competition, her task cannot be executed on the processor, since it requires
higher utilization and will potentially miss a deadline. We assume that the system
employs a mechanism for temporally isolating tasks during execution and enforcing a
winning agent to execute only her requested utilization. Such mechanism is described
in [2]. In this mechanism, if a task needs more than its reported utilization, it may slow
down if it jeopardizes the schedulability of the other tasks.

3.2

Exact Mechanisms

Nisan and Ronen [27] showed that the truthfulness of a mechanism can be guaranteed by standard Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)-based mechanisms [11, 16, 32], if the
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mechanism is able to compute the optimal solution.
VCG Mechanism. A mechanism composed of allocation algorithm A and payment
algorithm π is called a VCG mechanism if
• A(θ̂) is the allocation that maximizes the social welfare (i.e.,
• πi =

P

j∈A(θ̂−i )

v̂j −

P

j∈A(θ̂),j6=i

P

i∈A(θ̂)

v̂i ), and

v̂j

We define the VCG-based mechanism that solves the EDF-MAXVAL problem as follows.
EDF-MAXVAL-VCG Mechanism. The EDF-MAXVAL-VCG mechanism consists
of the allocation algorithm EDF-MAXVAL-DP and the payment defined by:
πiV CG =

X

v̂j −

j∈AEDF (θ̂ −i )

X

v̂j

(3.1)

j∈AEDF (θ̂),j6=i

where AEDF is the allocation algorithm EDF-MAXVAL-DP.
We also define the VCG-based mechanism that solves the RM-MAXVAL problem as
follows.
RM-MAXVAL-VCG Mechanism. The RM-MAXVAL-VCG mechanism consists of
the allocation algorithm RM-MAXVAL-DP and the payment defined by:
πiV CG =

X

j∈ARM (θ̂ −i )

v̂j −

X

v̂j

(3.2)

j∈ARM (θ̂),j6=i

where ARM is the allocation algorithm RM-MAXVAL-DP.
The first term in Equations 3.1 and 3.2, represents the optimal welfare obtained
when Agent i is excluded from the competition, and the second term represents the
sum of all values in the optimal set except Agent i’s value. EDF-MAXVAL-DP and
RM-MAXVAL-DP compute the optimum social welfare but they are not polynomially
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computable. EDF-MAXVAL determines the winning agents in O(n2 V ) time and for
each wining agent it computes the payment using Equation 3.1 by solving an EDFMAXVAL problem with n − 1 agents. Hence, computing the payments needs at most
nO((n − 1)2 V ) = O(n3 V ). Using the same analysis, the RM-MAXVAL-VCG mechanism
computes the allocations and payments in O(n4 V ). Thus, the EDF-MAXVAL-DP and
RM-MAXVAL-DP are pseudo-polynomial time mechanisms.

3.3

Frugality

In a truthful mechanism, the payment by an agent is less than her declared value.
Agents may have multiple choices and would like to pay lower amounts for obtaining
the processor; thus, from the agents’ perspective, lower payments are desirable. We
measure the total payment made by agents by the frugality ratio. In the following, we
identify an appropriate definition of frugality ratio and investigate the frugality of the
EDF-MAXVAL-VCG and RM-MAXVAL-VCG mechanisms.
The study of frugality in the context of mechanism design was initiated by Archer
and Tardos [4]. They investigated the frugality of path auctions in weighted directed
graphs and showed that the total payment of any truthful mechanism for path auctions
can be a linear factor of the second optimal disjoint path. However, there are other
different definitions for frugality in the literature. Talwar [30] defined the frugality ratio
of VCG mechanisms for set system problems. They defined the frugality ratio as the
worst possible ratio of the payment to the cost of the best rival solution. Karlin et al. [17]
argued that a natural choice for the frugality ratio is the overpayment of a mechanism
compared to the minimum payment by a non-truthful mechanism; hence, the frugality
ratio characterizes the cost of truthfulness. They proposed the Nash Equilibrium [26] as
the lower bound for the payments. They proved that the VCG mechanism has a frugality
ratio of 1 for monopoly-free matroid systems.
The question is: how should we measure the frugality in our competitive real-time
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setting? A trivial way to define the frugality is to compare the total payments to the
mechanism to the sum of the winning agents’ declared values. We now argue that this
definition results in unstable behavior of the frugality ratio and it is not suitable for
characterizing frugality in our setting. In the EDF-MAXVAL-VCG mechanism, if a
winning agent raises her value, her payment will not change, thus, a good definition for
the frugality ratio should not depend on the declared values of the winning agents. For
example, let us assume that the frugality ratio is defined as the ratio of total payments to
the sum of the declared values of the winning agents. Consider the problem instance given
in Table 2.1. The EDF-MAXVAL-VCG mechanism allocates the processor to agents 1,
2, and 5. The payments of the winning Agents 1, 2, and 5 are 1, 2, and 9, respectively.
Thus, the frugality ratio is (1 + 2 + 9)/(4 + 5 + 11) = 0.6. Now, if we assume that the
declared value of Agent 5 is 100, the payments are still the same, and the frugality ratio is
12/109 which is less than 0.6. If Agent 5 declares a high value, the frugality ratio will be
close to zero. Thus, employing this definition, the frugality ratio can be changed easily
since it depends on the values of the winning agents despite the payments remaining
unchanged.
From the processor owner’s perspective, a drawback of a truthful mechanism is that
the payments can be even lower than the total value of the second optimal disjoint set,
which is the optimal set of agents obtained from solving the problem while excluding the
winning agents from the original problem. Thus, comparing the total payment to the
second disjoint optimum is a reasonable way to evaluate the frugality of the mechanism.
′
Let OP Tdis
be the sum of the values of the agents in the second disjoint optimal set.
′
Recall that we assume that the set of tasks cannot be feasibly scheduled; thus OP Tdis
is

well-defined. We use the definition of Talwar [30] who defined the frugality ratio as the
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total payments divided by the second disjoint optimum value, i.e., the frugality ratio is

F=

n
X
i=1

πi
′
OP Tdis

(3.3)

A frugality ratio less than one indicates that the total payments to the mechanism are
less than the social welfare the mechanism could get by selecting the second disjoint
optimal set of agents. A frugality ratio greater than one indicates that the mechanism
receives more payment than the total value of the resource according to the second
disjoint optimal set of agents.
We now compute an upper bound on the frugality ratio of the VCG mechanism for
a special class of set systems we call inclusive set systems. This class of set systems has
the property that every subset of a feasible set is also feasible. A formal definition of
inclusive set systems is as follows.
Inclusive Set System. Consider the set system (E, F ) where E is the list of elements
and F ⊆ 2E is the set of all feasible subsets of E. (E, F ) is inclusive if for each feasible
set S, all its subsets are also feasible, i.e., for all S ∈ F , S ′ ∈ F for all S ′ ⊆ S.
The implicit-deadline sporadic task system for EDF is inclusive, because if a set S is
feasible (U(S) ≤ 1 ), then each subset S ′ ⊆ S is also feasible (because U(S ′ ) ≤ 1). The
sporadic task system for RM is also inclusive. Suppose that set system S is feasible, i.e.,
U(S) ≤ |S|(21/|S| − 1). Since URM (n) = n(21/n − 1) is a decreasing function, thus for any
S ′ ⊆ S we have URM (|S ′ |) ≥ URM (S). This with the fact that U(S ′ ) ≤ U(S), implies
that S ′ is feasible. Therefore, the implicit deadline sporadic task system for RM is also
inclusive.
We prove that the maximum frugality ratio of any VCG mechanism for inclusive set
systems is equal to the number of winning agents. Thus, the frugality ratios of EDFMAXVAL-VCG and RM-MAXVAL-VCG mechanisms are bounded.
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S∗

Sd
S1
S2
S3
S−i

F

Figure 3.1: Computing payments
Theorem 3.3.1 The maximum frugality ratio of the VCG mechanism for inclusive set
systems is k, where k is the number of winning agents.
Proof Suppose N is the set of agents and F ⊆ 2N is the set of feasible sets. Assume
that S ∗ ⊂ F is a set of winning agents with cardinality k and Sd is the second disjoint
optimum set. We denote by V (S), the sum of the values of all agents in set S, i.e.,
P
V (S) = i∈S vi .
Now we compute the VCG-payment by Agent i ∈ S ∗ and show that it is not greater
than V (Sd ). Let S−i be the optimum set by excluding Agent i, S1 = S ∗ \S−i , S2 = S ∗ ∩S−i
and S3 = S−i \ S ∗ (Figure 3.1). From Equations 3.1 and 3.2, Agent i’s VCG payment is
πiV CG = V (S−i ) − V (S ∗ ) + vi . We get,
πiV CG = V (S2 ) + V (S3 ) − (V (S1 ) + V (S2 )) + vi

(3.4)

= V (S3 ) − (V (S1 ) − vi )

Since i ∈ S1 , we have V (S1 ) ≥ vi , this along with (3.4) implies that πiV CG ≤ V (S3 ). S3
is feasible, because it is a subset of feasible set S−i . Since S3 is disjoint from S ∗ and Sd
is the optimum disjoint feasible set, then we have V (S3 ) ≤ V (Sd ), πiV CG ≤ V (Sd ), for all
P
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Thus, 1≤i≤k πiV CG ≤ kV (Sd ). Then, F ≤ k.
Now, we show that this bound is tight for EDF-MAXVAL-VCG and RM-MAXVALVCG mechanisms by giving examples of a set of agents that achieves this bound. Consider
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an environment of n agents as displayed in Table 3.1 which should be scheduled based
on EDF algorithm. The total payment is (n − 1)V ′ and the sum of the values of the
second disjoint optimum set is V ′ . Hence, F = (n − 1)V ′ /V ′ = n − 1. Thus, a larger
value of n results in a larger frugality ratio. For RM-MAXVAL-VCG, the example
shown in Table 3.2, illustrates the tightness of the bound. The total payment is again
(n − 1)V ′ and the sum of the values of the second disjoint optimum set is V ′ . Hence,
F = (n − 1)V ′ /V ′ = n − 1.
Table 3.1: Example illustrating tightness of upper bound on the frugality ratio for EDFMAXVAL-VCG
Agent

a1

a2

...

an−1

an

ûi

1
n−1

1
n−1

...

1
n−1

1
n−1

v̂i

V

V

...

V

V′ < V

Winner?

Yes

Yes

...

Yes

No

πi

V′

V′

...

V′

0

Table 3.2: Example illustrating tightness of upper bound on the frugality ratio for RMMAXVAL-VCG
Agent

a1
1

a2

...

1

ûi

2 n−1 − 1

2 n−1 − 1 . . .

v̂i

V

V

Winner?

Yes

πi

V′

an−1
1

an

2 n−1 − 1

1

...

V

V′ < V

Yes

...

Yes

No

V′

...

V′

0

The minimum frugality ratio is zero and it is obtained when all payments are zero.
If for each winning agent the optimum set by excluding that agent is a subset of the set
of winning agents, all payments will be zero.
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CHAPTER 4
APPROXIMATION MECHANISMS
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the running times of EDF-MAXVAL-VCG
and RM-MAXVAL-VCG are not polynomial in the system input size. In this chapter, we
explore techniques for reducing the computational complexity by providing approximate
mechanisms instead of exact mechanisms. That is, the mechanisms are not guaranteed to obtain the optimal welfare, but near-optimal welfare. In Section 4.1, we present
the mechanism design concepts that will be employed in the design of our approximation
mechanisms for solving the EDF-MAXVAL and RM-MAXVAL problems. In Section 4.2,
we present approximation algorithms that solve the problems in non-competitive environments. In Section 4.3, we discuss why we cannot use these approximation algorithms
for non-competitive environments as building blocks of truthful mechanisms, and design
monotonic approximation algorithms suitable for the competitive setting. In Section 4.4,
we give a new bound on the frugality ratio of these mechanisms as applied to our scheduling problems.

4.1

Characterization of Truthful Approximation Mechanisms

Monotonicity of the allocation algorithm is a necessary condition for a mechanism
to be truthful [18]. An allocation algorithm is monotone when for any winning agent,
she also wins by increasing the value or decreasing the utilization while all other agents’
types are fixed. Before giving the formal definition of a monotone algorithm, we define
the comparison operator for agents’ types.
Agent-Type Partial Ordering. Type θ̂i = (ûi , v̂i ) is greater than type θ̂i′ = (û′i , v̂i′ ) if
ûi < û′i and v̂i > v̂i′ . It is smaller if ûi > û′i and v̂i < v̂i′ . They are equal if ûi = û′i and
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v̂i = v̂i′ . They are not comparable in any other situation. We denote greater, less and
equal operators by ≻, ≺ and =, respectively. We similarly define ’greater than or equal’
and ’less than or equal’ comparison operators.
Monotonicity. (Mu’alem and Nisan [25]) An allocation algorithm A is monotone if, for
every Agent i and every θ̂ −i , if θ̂i is a winning declaration, then every higher declaration
θ̂i′  θ̂i is also winning. In other words, if Agent i wins by declaring ûi and v̂i , she also
wins by declaring û′i ≤ ûi and v̂i′ ≥ v̂i .
Lemma 4.1.1 (Critical Value) (Mu’alem and Nisan [25]) Let A be a monotone allocation algorithm, then, for every θ̂ −i there exists a unique value vic such that ∀θ̂i  (ûi , vic ),
θ̂i is a winning declaration, and ∀θ̂i ≺ (ûi , vic ), θ̂i is a losing declaration. We refer to this
single value as the critical value of Agent i.
Payment. The payment scheme π A associated with the monotone allocation algorithm
A that is based on the critical value is defined as follow:

πiA =



 v c if i wins,
i

 0

(4.1)

otherwise.

where vic is the critical value of Agent i.
Theorem 4.1.2 (Truthfulness) (Mu’alem and Nisan [25]) An individually rational
mechanism (i.e., a mechanism where agents are guaranteed non-negative utility if they
report their true types) is truthful if and only if its allocation algorithm is monotone and
its payment scheme is based on the critical value.
Now, we present the definition of bitonicity which will be used later to design truthful
approximation mechanisms. Simply, an allocation algorithm is bitonic, if for any Agent
j, the social welfare does not increase with θ̂j when Agent j loses, and increase with θ̂j
when Agent j wins.
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Bitonicity. (Mu’alem and Nisan [25]) An allocation algorithm is bitonic if it is monotone, and for every agent j and any θ̂−j , the social welfare function is a non-increasing
function of θ̂j for vj < vjc (Agent j is losing), and a non-decreasing function of θ̂j for
vj ≥ vjc (Agent j is winning).
The bitonicity property helps us to obtain monotone allocation algorithms by combining monotone allocation algorithms. The combination operators can be MAX and
the If-then-Else operators. We later use these operators to design approximate truthful
mechanisms. One of the most useful operators to combine two allocation algorithms is
the MAX operator which try both algorithms and picks the first one.
MAX Operator. (Mu’alem and Nisan [25]) Given two allocation algorithms A1 and
A2 , the algorithm MAX(A1 , A2 )
• Run both algorithms A1 and A2 .
• if ωA1 (θ̂) ≥ ωA2 (θ̂) return A1 (θ̂), else return A2 (θ̂), where ω is the social welfare
function.
General this algorithm is not guaranteed to be monotone even if both algorithms A1 and
A2 be monotone algorithms. the following theorem shows that if A1 and A2 be bitonic
algorithms, then MAX(A1 , A2 ) is bitonic and monotone.
Theorem 4.1.3 (Mu’alem and Nisan [25]) If A1 and A2 be two bitonic algorithms, then
MAX(A1 , A2 ) is also a bitonic algorithm.
In the next sections, we design truthful approximation mechanisms for EDF-MAXVAL
and RM-MAXVAL problems.
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4.2

Approximation Algorithms

Algorithms EDF-MAXVAL-DP and RM-MAXVAL-DP are pseudo-polynomial algorithms. In this section, we present approximation algorithms that solve the EDFMAXVAL and RM-MAXVAL problems. These algorithms are based on rounding the
values of tasks.
The EDF-MAXVAL problem can be approximately solved by using Algorithm 3 [31]
which rounds the ‘vi ’s to admit only a polynomial number of different valuations and
then solve optimally by using the EDF-MAXVAL-DP algorithm. The running time of
the algorithm is O(n2 ⌊V α⌋) = O(n2 ⌊n/ǫ⌋) [31], which is polynomial in n and 1/ǫ. Thus,
the proposed algorithm is an FPTAS algorithm.
Algorithm 3 FPTAS Allocation Algorithm for EDF-MAXVAL
1:
2:
3:
4:

input: û1 , . . . , ûn and v̂1 , . . . , v̂n .
n
α := ǫv̂max
;
for all i set vi′ = ⌊α · v̂i ⌋;
return EDF-MAXVAL-DP (u1 , . . . , un ; v1′ , . . . , vn′ )

We use the same technique for solving the RM-MAXVAL problem by using the RMMAXVAL-DP algorithm. The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 4. We can prove that
this algorithm is FPTAS similar to the proof provided in [31]. The running time of the
algorithm is O(n3 ⌊V α⌋) = O(n3 ⌊n/ǫ⌋), which is polynomial in n and 1/ǫ.
Algorithm 4 FPTAS Allocation Algorithm for RM-MAXVAL
1:
2:
3:
4:

input: û1 , . . . , ûn and v̂1 , . . . , v̂n .
n
α := ǫv̂max
;
for all i set vi′ = ⌊α · v̂i ⌋;
return RM-MAXVAL-DP (u1 , . . . , un ; v1′ , . . . , vn′ )

4.3

Truthful Approximation Mechanisms

The FPTAS algorithms given in Algorithms 3 and 4 do not satisfy the required
monotonicity property, and, thus, cannot be used as allocation algorithms in truthful
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Algorithm 5 EDF-MAXVAL-AA: Monotone FPTAS for EDF-MAXVAL
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:

input: û1 , . . . , ûn and v̂1 , . . . , v̂n .
V := maxi v̂i , opt = 0, O = ∅
for j = 0 to log ((1 − ǫ)−1 n) + 1 do
k := ⌈log (V )⌉ − j;
αk := ǫ·2nk ;
for i = 1 to n do
vi′ := min {v̂i , 2k+1 };
vi′′ := ⌊αk · vi′ ⌋;
end for
(opt′ , O′ ) = EDF-MAXVAL-DP (u1 , . . . , un ; v1′′ , . . . , vn′′ )
if opt′ > opt then
O = O′ ;
opt = opt′ ;
end if
end for
output (opt, O);

mechanisms. They are not monotone because the rounding depends on the highest
valuation. Briest et al. [9] proposed general approximation techniques for utilitarian
mechanism design. A utilitarian mechanism aims to select an output that maximizes
the total welfare. They used the concept of bitonicity first introduced in [25]. Given
a monotone algorithm A, the property of bitonicity requires that the welfare does not
increase with vi when vi loses (vi < vic ), and it does increase with vi when vi wins
(vi > vic ). Briest et al. [9] showed that the algorithm that finds the maximum welfare
over the outputs of a set of bitonic algorithms is monotone. Algorithm 5 directly applies
the utilitarian mechanism design technique of Briest et al. [9] to obtain a solution for EDFMAXVAL problem by finding the maximum over the outputs of a bitonic algorithm (Lines
5-10), and thus, by using Theorem 4.1.3 it is monotone. The bitonicity of Lines 5-10 can
be proved by a similar argument provided in [9]. It is an FPTAS for EDF-MAXVAL and
hence it can be used as the allocation algorithm for a truthful approximation mechanism.
A similar algorithm can be provided for RM-MAXVAL problem. The only change
needed is in Line 10 which refers to RM-MAXVAL-DP. We refer to this algorithm (shown
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Algorithm 6 RM-MAXVAL-AA: Monotone FPTAS for RM-MAXVAL
1:
2:
3:
4:

input: û1 , . . . , ûn and v̂1 , . . . , v̂n .
Same as Lines 2-9 in Algorithm 5
(opt′ , O′ ) = RM-MAXVAL-DP (u1 , . . . , un ; v1′′ , . . . , vn′′ )
Same as Lines 11-16 in Algorithm 5

Algorithm 7 PAY: Payment for winning Agent i
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:

a = 0; b = vi ;
while b − a > 1 do
vic = (a + b)/2
if Agent i is winning by declaring vic then
b = vic
else
a = vic
end if
end while
vic = b;
return vic

in Algorithm 6) as RM-MAXVAL-AA.
The payments are based on the critical types of the winning agents. The payment of
winning Agent i is vic , where vic is the critical value of Agent i, if i wins and zero if i loses.
Finding the critical value is done by a binary search over values less than the declared
value (Algorithm 7).
In the following, we design two truthful approximation mechanisms for solving the
EDF-MAXVAL and RM-MAXVAL problems as follows.
EDF-MAXVAL-APROX Mechanism. The EDF-MAXVAL-APROX mechanism consists of the allocation algorithm EDF-MAXVAL-AA and the payment algorithm PAY.
RM-MAXVAL-APROX Mechanism. The RM-MAXVAL-APROX mechanism consists of the allocation algorithm RM-MAXVAL-AA and the payment algorithm PAY.
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4.4

Frugality of Approximation Mechanisms

In this section, we provide a bound on the frugality ratios of proposed approximation
mechanisms. Briest et al. [9] showed that, if A is a truthful (1 + ǫ)−approximation
mechanism it holds that
ǫ
πA
(n + 2) ≤ V CG ≤ 1 + ǫ(n + 2)
1+ǫ
π

(4.2)

where π A is the FPTAS mechanism total payment and π V CG is the VCG total payment.
Using Theorem 3.3.1, we can derive a formula for the upper bound on the frugality ratio
for any truthful FPTAS mechanism for any inclusive set system (which includes the
set systems associated with the implicit-deadline sporadic tasks based on EDF and RM
scheduling algorithms).
Theorem 4.4.1 The upper bound on frugality ratio for any truthful (1+ǫ)-approximation
mechanism A for inclusive set systems is (1+ǫ(n+2))k where k is the number of winning
agents.
Proof Using Equation 4.2, we get π A < (1 + ǫ(n + 2))π V CG . By Theorem 3.3.1, the
maximum frugality ratio is equal to k for inclusive set systems, so π V CG /V (Sd ) is at most
k, where V (Sd ) is the sum of the values in the second disjoint optimum set. Thus, we
have π V CG ≤ kV (Sd ). So π A < (1+ǫ(n+2))kV (Sd ) and F = π A /V (Sd ) ≤ (1+ǫ(n+2))k.

4.5

Approximation Mechanisms with Reserve Prices

As we discussed, the payments calculated by the VCG and the approximate mechanisms, are less than the agents’ declared values and sometimes they can be zero. A
processing resource owner may introduce reserve prices to ensure that the costs of operating the system are recovered (e.g., energy costs to run the processor) and that a certain
minimum profit margin is achieved. In order to guarantee a minimum profit, we can define a reserve price per utility that is the lower bound on the sale price of the processor
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for 100 percent of utilization. Let the reserve price for using the full utilization of the
processor be C. The reported value of Agent i should be at least ûi C, i.e., v̂i ≥ ûi C,
where (ûi , v̂i ) is the declared type of Agent i. We define the reserve price mechanisms for
EDF-MAXVAL and RM-MAXVAL problems as follows.
EDF-MAXVAL-APROX-R. The EDF-MAXVAL-APROX-R mechanism consists of
the allocation algorithm EDF-MAXVAL-AA and the payment defined by:
πiR = max{vic , ui ∗ C}

i = 1, . . . , n

(4.3)

RM-MAXVAL-APROX-R. The RM-MAXVAL-APROX-R mechanism consists of the
allocation algorithm RM-MAXVAL-AA and the payment defined by:
πiR = max{vic , ui ∗ C}

i = 1, . . . , n

(4.4)

where vic is the critical value computed by PAY (Algorithm 4) and C is the reserve price.
We prove that the mechanisms with reserve prices are truthful.
Theorem 4.5.1 The EDF-MAXVAL-APROX-R and RM-MAXVAL-APROX-R mechanisms are truthful.
Proof Consider that Agent i is declaring a non-truthful type θ̂i = (ûi , v̂i ) 6= θi = (ui , vi ).
Let the utilities of Agent i by truthful and non-truthful type declarations be µi and µ̂i .
We consider the following possible cases and show that µ̂i ≤ µi in all cases.
1. Agent i wins by both declaring θ̂i and θi . Since the payments are independent from
agent’s declaration, the utilities in both cases are equal.
2. Agent i loses by both declaring θ̂i and θi . The utilities are zero in both cases.
3. Agent i loses by declaring θ̂i and wins by declaring θi . By the monotonicity property
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of the allocation algorithm, we have v̂i < vic ≤ vi . This with the fact that vi ≥ ui ∗C
implies that πiR = max{vic , ui ∗ C} ≤ vi and hence µi = vi − πiR ≥ 0 = µ̂i .
4. Agent i wins by declaring θ̂i and loses by declaring θi . By the monotonicity property
of the allocation algorithm, we have v̂i ≥ vic > vi . This with πiR ≥ vic implies that
πiR > vi , thus, µ̂i = vi − πiR < 0 = µi .
We showed that truthful declaration is a dominant strategy and hence, the mechanism
is truthful.
Since each agent is at least paying C times her declared utilization, the minimum
total payment by all winning agents is C times the sum of the utilizations. Hence, the
lower bound on the frugality ratio of the approximation mechanism with reserve prices
is C · mini∈{1..n} ûi . The upper bound on the frugality ratio is the same as that of the
mechanism without reserve price.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We perform a set of experiments to investigate the effects of non-truthful type declarations, comparing payments to the reported values, determining the frugality ratios
of the mechanisms and also evaluating the execution time of the mechanisms. In Section 5.1, we investigate the effect of non-truthful value declaration by an agent and show
how this affects the utility of her and other agents. In Section 5.2, we generate a set of
problem instances and investigate the frugality ratios and payments. In Section 5.3, we
evaluate the execution times of the exact and approximate mechanisms.
In order to generate the utilizations of the agents we used the UUniFast-Discard
method described in [12] with a discard limit equal to half the number of agents. UUniFastDiscard (Algorithm 8) uses the UUniFast method [8] which takes as input the number
of agents and parameter U which is the target sum of the utilizations. UUniFast was
designed for generating a set of tasks with total utilization of at most 1. Since UUniFast may generate utilizations that are greater then 1 for U > 1, UUniFast-Discard
was designed to ensure that all generated individualized task utilizations are less than 1.
UUniFast-Discard takes as input the number of agents, total utilization and a limit for
discarding the number of generated utilizations. When a utilization generated by UUniFast is greater than 1, UUniFast-Discard discards all the generated utilizations and starts
from the beginning. If the number of discarded values exceeds the limit, the method reports failing. We set the target utilization U to 5 and the discard limit to half of the
number of agents. For the value generation we use a random uniform number generator to generate a vector of integers within [1, 1000]. Then, each value is computed by
multiplying the corresponding entry in this vector with its associated utilization. Using this approach the values are correlated with the utilizations. For the approximation
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Algorithm 8 UUniFast-Discard Algorithm
1: input: n, U.
2: discarded=0, success = true, sumU = U
3: for i = 1 to n − 1 do
1
4:
nextSumU = sumU × (rand) n−i
5:
vectU(i) = sumU − nextSumU;
6:
if vectU(i) > 1 then
7:
discarded=discarded+1
8:
i = 1;
9:
if discarded> n/2 then
10:
success= f alse
11:
end if
12:
end if
13:
sumU = nextSumU;
14: end for
15: vectU(n) = sumU
16: output (vectU, success)

Agent
ui
vi

Table 5.1: Agents’ true parameters
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0.10 0.15 0.20 0.24 0.30 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.25
120 400 300 550 600 270 350 125 340 410

mechanism EDF-MAXVAL-APPROX we use ǫ = 0.1. We use the Microsoft Visual C++
environment on an 8-core Intel Core i7 (1.73GHz) machine to generate the problem instances and implement the algorithms.

5.1

Non-Truthful Type Declaration

In this set of experiments, we investigate the effect of reporting non-truthful utilizations and values by an agent in EDF-MAXVAL-APROX and RM-MAXVAL-APROX
mechanisms. We show how this affects the utility of a lying agent and also those of the
other agents. We consider an environment composed of ten agents. The actual utilization
and values of these agents are shown in Table 5.1. In the following, we discuss the results
for both EDF-based and RM-based mechanism.
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5.1.1

Results for EDF-based Mechanisms

We first investigate how a lying agent can affect the utilities and payments of other
agents for the EDF-based mechanisms. If all agents declare their true types, Agents 2,
4, 5, 6 and 7 win the competition and their payments will be 300, 420, 530, 150 and
150, respectively. As shown in Table 5.1, the true type of Agent 5 is θ5 = (0.30, 600).
We consider that Agent 5 is misreporting her type. This leads to six cases as shown in
Table 5.2. In Case I, Agent 5 is reporting her true value. In Case II, she is declaring a
value greater than her actual value while she is winning the competition. In Case III and
Case IV, a non-true value is reported by Agent 5 with the difference that she is winning
in Case III but losing in Case IV. In Case V and VI, she is reporting her actual value
but reporting utilizations greater than her actual utilization. In Case V, she is winning
but in Case VI she is losing.
In Figure 5.1(a), we show the utilities of Agent 5 in all these cases. By reporting the
true type, Agent 5 wins the competition and her utility is 70. The utility of Agent 5 is
less than or equal to 70 in all the other cases. This is expected, because our mechanism
is truthful and the maximum utility is obtained by truth telling. Since Agent 5 loses in
Cases IV and VI her utilities in these cases are zero. In all other cases, she wins and
obtains the same utility as in Case I, in which she reports her true type.
Now, we investigate how reporting non-true types affects the utilities of the other
agents. In Figure 5.1(b), we show the utilities of the Agents 1, 2, 4, 6, 7 and 10 in each
of the cases (Since Agents 3 and 9 are losing in all cases, they are not shown in the
figure). As we can see, utilities of other agents are changing in most cases. These results
show that lying by one agent has a significant effect on the outcome and utility of the
other agents. The reason is that, by non-true declaration of Agent 5, the allocations
may change and also the agents may have different critical values and hence different
payments. For example utilities of Agent 4 in each case is shown in Table 5.3. As we can
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Table 5.2: Different type declarations by Agent 5
Case No
θ̂5
Remark
I
(0.30, 600)
True type
II
(0.30, 700) v̂5 > v5 , û5 = u5
III
(0.30, 550) v̂5 < v5 , û5 = u5
IV
(0.30, 400) v̂5 < v5 , û5 = u5
(0.35, 600) v̂5 = v5 , û5 > u5
V
VI
(0.40, 600) v̂5 = v5 , û5 > u5
800

300

Payment
Utility
Agent 5’s actual value

Agent 1
Agent 2
Agent 4
Agent 6
Agent 7
Agent 10

700
250
600
200

No payment

400

and utility

Utility

500

150

300
100
200
50
100

0

0
I

II

III

IV

V

VI

I

Case

(a)

II

III

IV

V

VI

Case

(b)

Figure 5.1: Results for EDF-based mechanisms: (a) The utility and payment of Agent 5
in different cases; (b) The utilities of agents in different cases (The agents that are losing
in all cases are not shown in the figure).
see the utility of Agent 4, in Case IV in which Agent 5 is declaring a utilization greater
than her actual utilization is 210 while in Case I her utility is 130.
Table 5.3: The utilities of Agent 4 in each case for EDF
I
II
III IV
V
VI
Case
Utility 130 130 130 210 140 180

5.1.2

Results for RM-based Mechanisms

Now, we investigate the effects of non-truthful type declaration on the mechanism for
the RM-based mechanisms. If all agents report their true types, Agents 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7
win the competition and their payments will be 70, 290, 480, 220 and 220, respectively.
As shown in Table 5.4, the true type of Agent 4 is θ4 = (0.24, 550). Consider that
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0
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VI
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Figure 5.2: Results for RM-based mechanisms: (a) The utility and payment of Agent 4
in different cases; (b) The utilities of agents in different cases (The agents that are losing
in all cases are not shown in the figure).
Agent 4 is misreporting her type in different cases which are shown in Table 5.4. In
Case I, Agent 4 is reporting her true value. In Case II, she is declaring a value greater
than her actual value while she is winning the competition. In Case III and Case IV, a
non-true value is reported by Agent 4 with the difference that she is winning in Case III
but losing in Case IV. In Case V and VI, she is reporting her actual value but reporting
utilizations greater than her actual utilization. In Case V, she is winning but in Case VI
she is losing.
In Figure 5.2(a), we show the utilities of Agent 4 in all these cases. By reporting the
true type, Agent 4 wins the competition and her utility is 70. As we expected in the
EDF example, the utility of Agent 4 is less than or equal to 70 in all the other cases. In
Case V, the utility of Agent 4 is 20, which is less than her utility in Case I, that is 70. In
this case, Agents 2, 4, 7 and 9 are winning. Since the maximum utilization of a system
of 4 tasks to be schedulable by RM is less than the maximum utilization of a task system
of 5 tasks (Case I), thus we expect more payments by agents. Therefore we expect that
in Case V with 4 winning agents, the utility of Agent 4 is higher than the Case I with 5
winning agents.

39
Table 5.4: Different type declarations by Agent 4 for RM
Case No
θ̂4
Remark
I
(0.24, 550)
True type
II
(0.24, 600) v̂4 > v4 , û4 = u4
III
(0.24, 500) v̂4 < v4 , û4 = u4
IV
(0.30, 450) v̂4 < v4 , û4 = u4
(0.25, 550) v̂4 = v4 , û4 > u4
V
VI
(0.30, 550) v̂4 = v4 , û4 > u4
Now, we investigate how reporting non-true types affects the utilities of the other
agents. In Figure 5.2(b), we show the utilities of the Agents 1, 2, 6 and 7 in each of
the cases (Since Agents 3, 5, 8, 9 and 10 are losing in all cases, they are not shown in
the figure). As we can see, utilities of other agents are changing in most cases. These
results show that lying by one agent has a significant effect on the outcome and utility of
the other agents. The reason is that, by non-true declaration of Agent 4, the allocations
may change and also the agents may have different critical values and hence different
payments. As we discussed in the previous paragraph, the utilities of all agents decreases
in Case V.

5.2

Payments and Frugality Ratios

Now we perform a set of experiments to illustrate the frugality ratio for both EDFMAXVAL-VCG and EDF-MAXVAL-APROX mechanisms. We calculate the frugality
ratio for problem instances with different number of agents ranging from 10 to 200. For
each problem size we generate 100 problem instances and calculate the frugality ratio for
each of them.
In Figure 5.3(a), we show the average payment of agents comparing to the average
declared values for the EDF-MAXVAL-APROX mechanism. The payments are small
compared to the declared values for cases with a small numbers of agents, which results
in lower revenue of the processor owner. We can see that as the number of agents is
increasing, the payments are being closer to the sum of the values and the processor
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Figure 5.3: Results for EDF-based mechanisms: (a) Payments vs. Values; (b) Frugality
ratio as a function of number of agents; (c) The execution times of EDF-MAXVAL-VCG
and EDF-MAXVAL-APROX for n = 20; (d) The execution times of EDF-MAXVALVCG and EDF-MAXVAL-APROX for n = 40.
owner’s revenue increases.
In Figure 5.3(b), we show the frugality ratio of EDF-MAXVAL-VCG and EDFMAXVAL-APROX mechanisms as a function of the number of agents. The figure shows
that the frugality ratio of both mechanisms are very close. It also shows that in general
the frugality ratio grows with the number of agents. Participation of more agents in the
competition leads to higher frugality ratios and higher payments by agents compare to
their declared values. The average frugality over all problem instances is 1.1. Although
theoretically the frugality ratio can be as large as the number of the agents and also can
be as small as zero, we can see that in most cases it is between 1 and 1.2.
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Figure 5.4: Results for RM-based mechanisms: (a) Payments vs. Values; (b) Frugality
ratio as a function of number of agents; (c) The execution times of RM-MAXVAL-VCG
and RM-MAXVAL-APROX for n = 20; (d) The execution times of RM-MAXVAL-VCG
and RM-MAXVAL-APROX for n = 40;
The results for RM-MAXVAL problem are shown in Figure 5.4(a) and Figure 5.4(b).

5.3

Execution Time

We now perform simulations to compare the execution time of the EDF-MAXVALVCG and EDF-MAXVAL-APROX mechanisms. As we mentioned, the time complexity
of the EDF-MAXVAL-DP is O(n2 V ), where V is the maximum of the agents’ declared
values. Thus, the execution time of the EDF-MAXVAL-VCG mechanism is highly dependent on V . In this set of experiments, we run the mechanisms for different values of
V . We fix the number of agents and for each V ∈ {10, 60, . . . , 1010}, we generate ten
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problem instances and plot the average execution time. We perform the experiments
for n = 20 and n = 40. The utilization of the agents are generated using the same
method we discussed in Section 5.2. We use a uniform random number generator to
generate values in [1, V ]. The execution times of both the EDF-MAXVAL-VCG and
EDF-MAXVAL-APROX mechanisms are displayed in Figure 5.3(c). The figure reveals
that the execution time of the approximation mechanism is lower than the execution time
of the exact VCG mechanism for V > n/ǫ. As the value of V increases, the performance
of the approximation mechanism improves compared to the exact VCG mechanism. For
small values of V , the performance of the exact mechanism is better. The reason is
that in the approximation algorithm EDF-MAXVAL-AA, we multiply each value by
n/(ǫ · V ) = n/(0.1 · V ) = 10n/V . So for V < 10n, EDF-MAXVAL-AA takes more
time to complete. However, in Figure 5.3(c), the approximation mechanism has better
performance for V > 200, when n = 20, and for V > 400 when n = 40.
We obtained similar results by comparing the RM-MAXVAL-VCG and RM-MAXVALAPROX mechanisms. The time complexity of the RM-MAXVAL-VCG is O(n3 V ), where
V is the maximum of the agents’ declared values. We performed the same set of experiments as in the case of EDF-based mechanisms and the results are shown in Figure 5.4(c).
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Our main objective was to introduce the concept of designing real-time systems with
competition in mind. In this thesis, we explored the scheduling of implicit-deadline
sporadic task systems in a competitive environment in which each task is owned by a
selfish agent. Since each agent is self-interested and tries to maximize her own goals, we
used the mechanism design theory to design mechanisms to incentivize honest behavior
on the agents’ part. Since VCG Mechanism is the only exact mechanism that satisfies
the truthfulness property, we designed VCG-based mechanisms for solving the problems.
The VCG mechanisms are computationally intractable; thus, we designed truthful approximation mechanisms, which use fully-polynomial time approximation algorithms to
optimally allocate the processor to the agents. In this thesis we considered only single
deviations by the agents. As a future work, we will study the effect of collusion among
agents to lower their payments.
Our larger research goal is a comprehensive exploration of how competition affects
real-time resource allocation. Thus, for future work, we also plan to extend this initial
result to more complex real-time settings. As a next step, we would like to extend the
setting to exact mechanisms for uniprocessor fixed-priority scheduling that is non-trivial
and requires fundamentally new results not currently present in the mechanism design
literature. Our hope is that a thorough exploration of competition in real-time systems
will inform the design of future open and distributed real-time, embedded, and cyberphysical systems.
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In a non-competitive environment, sporadic real-time task scheduling on a single
processor is well understood. In this thesis, we consider a competitive environment
comprising several real-time tasks vying for execution upon a shared single processor.
Each task obtains a value if the processor successfully schedules all its jobs. Our objective
is to select a feasible subset of these tasks to maximize the sum of values of selected tasks.
We consider both dynamic-priority and static-priority scheduling algorithms. There are
algorithms for solving these problems in non-competitive settings. However, we consider
these problems in an economic setting in which each task is owned by a selfish agent. Each
agent reports the characteristics of her own task to the processor owner. The processor
owner uses a mechanism to allocate the processor to a subset of agents and to determine
the payment of each agent. Since agents are selfish, they may try to manipulate the
mechanism to obtain the processor. We are interested in truthful mechanisms in which
it is always in agents’ best interest to report the true characteristics of their tasks. We
design exact and approximate truthful mechanisms for this competitive environment and
study their performance.
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